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Abstract 
Prior studies have shown that attention is allocated to events relevant to the current goal of a 
person. Until now, research has focused on the implementation of a single goal leaving open the 
question of how attention is allocated when multiple goals are activated. We examined whether 
the allocation of spatial attention is affected by the prioritising of one goal over another. The 
results of two dot probe studies showed that attention is oriented to stimuli relevant to a goal 
with high value when simultaneously presented with stimuli relevant to a goal with low value 
(Experiment 1) and to stimuli relevant to a goal with high expectancy of success that were 
simultaneously presented with stimuli relevant to a goal with low expectancy of success 
(Experiment 2). These findings demonstrate that the allocation of spatial attention is dependent 
on the motivational strength of goal pursuit.  
Key words: spatial attention, attentional bias, motivation, multiple goal pursuit 
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           It is generally assumed that goals are a major determinant of attentional allocation 
(Allport, 1989; Desimone & Duncan, 1995). Supporting this assumption, it has been shown that 
attention is oriented to goal-relevant locations (Posner, 1980), that distractors resembling goal-
relevant events cause attentional interference (Maruff, Danckert, Camplin, & Currie, 1999; 
Rothermund, 2003), and that the actual goal of a person determines which stimuli in the 
environment reach awareness (Simons & Chabris, 1999).  
 The existing research has primarily investigated whether a single goal directs the 
allocation of attention. In most real-life situations, however, individuals are pursuing more than 
one goal at one time. Often these situations require giving priority to one goal because resources 
are limited or goals are incompatible (Johnson, Chang, & Lord, 2006). Consequently, one goal 
will be pursued with more motivational strength. Recent research demonstrated that cognitive 
processes underlying goal pursuit reflect the strength of goal pursuit (Förster, Liberman, & 
Higgins, 2005; Kruglanski et al., 2002). For instance, Förster and colleagues (2005) found that 
the activation level of words related to a task goal is higher in participants who were promised a 
high monetary reward for achieving this goal compared to participants promised only a low 
monetary reward, even though all participants were pursuing the goal. Applied to multiple goal 
pursuit situations, Shah, Friedman, and Kruglanski (2002) demonstrated that the mental 
representation of a prioritised goal is more activated than representations referring to non-
prioritised goals.  
The aim of the present study was to examine whether the prioritising of a goal affects the 
allocation of spatial attention. Attention is supposed to play a crucial role in the management of 
multiple goals (Johnson et al., 2006), but it is not yet clear how spatial attention is allocated 
when multiple goals are activated and when stimuli relevant to these different goals are 
competing in the environment of an individual. Recent evidence by Engelmann and colleagues 
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(Engelmann & Pessoa, 2007; Engelmann, Damajaru, Padmala, & Pessoa, 2009) showed that the 
detection of target stimuli was improved with increases in the monetary reward that was linked 
to the detection of these targets. These results suggest that the motivational strength with which a 
single goal is pursued influences how well goal-relevant events are perceived. In the present 
study, we assumed that the allocation of spatial attention is also sensitive to the relative relevance 
of multiple activated goals and that attention is therefore allocated primarily to stimuli relevant to 
the most important goal in a situation. In order to test this assumption, the present study 
investigated whether spatial attention is allocated to stimuli relevant to a high priority goal when 
simultaneously presented with stimuli relevant to a low priority goal. 
To examine this issue, we compared the effects of two goals with a different value 
(Experiment 1) or with different expectancy of success (Experiment 2). Classic theories of 
motivation (Tolman, 1955; Atkinson, 1964) state that the motivation to pursue a goal increases 
with the goal’s value and with the expectancy to achieve it. Consequently, we assumed that a 
goal with high value will be prioritised over a goal with low value (Experiment 1) and that a goal 
with high expectancy of success will be preferred over a goal with low expectancy of success 
(Experiment 2). 
We used a simple task to implement two goals. In each trial of this task, a single word 
appeared briefly on the screen. Participants were instructed to respond (by pressing the spacebar) 
when one of two words (e.g., “boat” or “field”) was presented. Correct reactions were rewarded 
with points and participants were instructed to strive for the maximum score on this task. More 
importantly, correct reactions to the words were rewarded in a different manner. In Experiment 
1, correct reactions to one word (e.g., “boat”) were rewarded with 90 points (high value goal) 
whereas correct reactions to the other word (e.g., “field”) were rewarded with 10 points (low 
value goal). In Experiment 2, correctly reacting to one word led to 90% chance of winning 100 
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points (high expectancy of success goal) whereas correct reactions to the other word carried 10% 
chance of winning 100 points (low expectancy of success goal).  
We used a second, independent task, a dot probe paradigm (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 
1986), in order to examine the allocation of spatial attention. In this task, two words were 
simultaneously presented at two different spatial locations on the screen, immediately followed 
by a probe. If individuals selectively attend to a particular word category, responses are faster to 
probes at the location previously occupied by these words. The goal-relevant words were used as 
cues in this task and trials of the dot probe task alternated with trials of the goal task. This 
procedure allowed us measuring attentional processing of goal-relevant words while participants 
were simultaneously pursuing the goals. However, because no points could be won in the dot 
probe task, attending to the goal-relevant words in the dot probe task was neither required nor 
instrumental for the achievement of the goals. Crucially, to investigate our main hypotheses, we 
employed trials comparing the two goal-relevant words to each other. We also used trials 
comparing one of the goal-relevant words to goal-unrelated control words. Because participants 
should be pursuing both the high and low priority goal, we expected an attentional bias to both 
goal-relevant words in comparison to control words. Of critical importance, we expected a bias 
to the words relevant to the high priority goal in trials presenting the two goal-relevant words 
simultaneously. 
Method 
Participants 
 A sample of 45 students (12 men) and a different sample of 29 students (7 men) at Ghent 
University took part in Experiments 1 and 2, respectively. Participants received course credits or 
were paid 5 €.   
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Apparatus and Materials 
 Words. 
We used four Dutch words as goal and control words: Werk (work), boot (boat), lijn 
(line), and veld (field). The control words were used in dot probe and goal task. They required no 
reaction in the goal task but were used also here in order to present goal-relevant and control 
words equally often in the whole experiment. Moreover, control words were as well explicitly 
mentioned in the instructions to control for effects of pre-exposure. The function of the words 
(goal or control) was counterbalanced between participants. The words were chosen in such a 
way that the initial letter of each word differed. All words were matched concerning frequency as 
indicated by the WordGen tool (Duyck, Desmet, Verbeke, & Brysbaert, 2004), word length and 
number of syllables. Two of these words (“werk” and “lijn”) were affectively neutral according 
to the database provided by Hermans and De Houwer (1994). The other two words (“boot” and 
“veld”) were not included in that database but can be considered to be neutral also.  
Four supplementary filler words were used in the goal task only. These words were: 
Computer (computer), tas (bag), kaas (cheese), and tafel (table). Three of these words (“tas”, 
“kaas”, “tafel”) were affectively neutral according to the database provided by Hermans and De 
Houwer (1994), the fourth word (“computer”) was considered to be neutral by the first author. In 
the practice block, five additional words were used. These words were: Fiets (bike), mango 
(mango), spinazie (spinach), aquarium (aquarium), and geweten (known). Filler words and 
words used in the practice phase were words that were considered as semantically unrelated to 
the goal-relevant and control words by the first author. 
All words were presented in Courier New font size 28. The experiment was programmed 
using Inquisit 2.0 (2005) software that was implemented on a Dell Dimension 5000 computer 
with an 85 Hz, 17-inch CRT monitor. All stimuli were presented against a black background.  
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Dot Probe and Goal Task 
A trial in the dot probe task started with the presentation of a black fixation cross (5 mm 
high) in a white square in the middle of the screen. Along with the fixation cross, two white 
rectangles (5 cm high x 6 cm wide) were presented above and below the fixation cross (Figure 
1). The middle of each of these peripheral rectangles was 4.6 cm from the fixation cross. Cues 
and probes were presented within the rectangles. The fixation screen was presented for 500 ms. 
Hereafter, two cue words appeared for 350 ms. Immediately after offset of the cue words, a 
probe consisting of a black square (0.5 cm x 0.5 cm) appeared. Responses required locating the 
probe by pressing one of two keys (“q”, “m”) with the left and right index finger on an AZERTY 
keyboard. Distribution of keys to probe locations was counterbalanced between participants. A 
trial ended after a response was registered or 1500 ms had elapsed since the onset of the probe. 
The fixation cross remained on the screen throughout a trial of the dot probe task. 
 
(Figure 1 about here) 
 
A trial of the goal task started with the appearance of a word in the middle of the screen 
for 150 ms, after which it was replaced by a red question mark (8 mm high). A trial ended with a 
response (pressing the spacebar, only required for the two goal-relevant words) or when 2000 ms 
had elapsed since the onset of the question mark (Figure 1). In Experiment 1, correct reactions to 
the goal-relevant words were followed by a feedback indicating the amount of points won. In 
Experiment 2, 90% of the trials of the low priority goal word and 10% of the trials of the high 
priority goal word were followed by a feedback indicating that no points were won. On the rest 
of the trials, the feedback indicated that points were won. Feedback was presented for 200 ms.  
Procedure 
Spatial attention and goal prioritising 
 
8
 Practice phase. 
Participants were seated approximately 60 cm from a computer screen. Instructions were 
presented on the screen. For the dot probe task, participants were asked to maintain attention at 
the fixation cross and to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible to the probe location. 
They were informed that after responding to the probe, a single word would be presented in the 
middle of the screen. If the word in the middle of screen was one of the two goal-relevant words, 
they should press the spacebar with both thumbs when the question mark appeared. Instructions 
for the goal task further stated that speed is not important in this task. 
 Test phase. 
Before the test phase, participants were shown the goal-relevant and control words and 
were told that these words would be used in the test phase. Participants were informed that they 
would win points for correctly indicating the presence of the goal-relevant words during the goal 
task. Participants were instructed to strive for the maximum score on this task. Furthermore, in 
Experiment 1 participants were told the amount of points per word (high value goal word: 90 
points; low value goal word: 10 points) and in Experiment 2 the probability of success per word 
(high success expectancy goal word: 100 points with 90% chance; low success expectancy goal 
word: 100 points with 10% chance). To make sure that participants picked up this information 
they had to repeat it by typing it in. They received feedback whether they were correct. 
Additionally, participants reported after the experiment (a) how much they had focused on each 
of the goal-relevant words in the goal task and (b) the amount of points (Experiment 1) or the 
probability of success (Experiment 2) that was assigned to these words. In Experiment 2, 
participants were also told explicitly that the words appearing in a dot probe trial were not 
predictive of the word appearing later on in the goal task trial. 
Dot probe and goal task consisted each of 160 trials (Experiment 1) or 192 trials 
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(Experiment 2). Each type of dot probe trial (goal vs. goal, high priority goal vs. control, low 
priority goal vs. control, control vs. control1) was presented 40 times (Experiment 1) or 48 times 
(Experiment 2). In both experiments, each cue word was presented on half of the trials in the 
upper cue location and on the other half in the lower cue location. Each cue word predicted the 
target location correctly on half of the trials. In Experiment 1, each goal and control word was 
presented 30 times in the goal trials. On the remaining 40 trials, a filler word was presented. In 
Experiment 2, each goal and control word was presented 40 times in the goal trials and filler 
words were presented on the remaining 32 trials. Hence, in both experiments, goal and control 
words were presented equally often. Trials of dot probe task and goal task alternated. The 
intertrial interval was 600 ms. The order of the trials of both tasks was determined randomly for 
each participant. The order of the dot probe task and goal task trials was determined 
independently. Hence, the cue words that were presented in a dot probe trial were not predictive 
of the word that would appear in the consequent trial of the goal task.  
Results 
Experiment 1 
 
One participant reported to have focused more strongly on the low value goal in the goal 
task. We excluded her data because in order to test our hypotheses it was necessary that subjects 
prioritised the high value goal in the goal task. The data of three female participants were 
excluded because they indicated to have believed that the values of the goals were opposite to 
their actual values (i.e., belief that the word leading to 90 points led to 10 points).2 Trials with 
errors in the dot probe trials were removed from the data (3.38%). For each participant, dot probe 
reaction times (RTs) shorter than 150 ms or larger than three standard deviations above the 
individual mean were discarded as outliers (1.88%). Means and standard deviations of the dot 
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probe task responses can be found in Table 1. Performance in the goal task was accurate (2.13% 
errors).3   
 
(Table 1 about here) 
 
 We performed four separate paired t-tests, one for each type of dot probe trial. The first 
analysis on trials comparing high value goal words to control words revealed that, as expected, 
RTs were significantly faster when the probe appeared on the former location of the high value 
goal word than when the probe appeared on the former location of a control word, M = 449 ms, 
SD = 67 ms, and, M = 465 ms, SD = 74 ms, respectively, t(40) = -2.94, p < .006. Second, as 
expected, in trials comparing the low value goal word to control words, probes were more 
rapidly detected when preceded by a low value goal word than when preceded by a control word, 
M = 447 ms, SD = 68 ms, and, M = 464 ms, SD = 75 ms, respectively, t(40) = -4.09, p < .001. Of 
critical importance were the trials comparing the two goal-relevant words. In line with our 
hypothesis, RTs were significantly faster when the probe appeared on the former location of the 
high value goal word than when the probe appeared on the former location of the low value goal 
word, M = 453 ms, SD = 68 ms, and, M = 463 ms, SD = 68 ms, respectively, t(40) = -2.28, p < 
.03. Fourth, RTs did not differ on trials comparing control words, t(40) = 1.32, ns. 
Experiment 2 
The same analyses were performed as for Experiment 1. The data of one participant were 
excluded because she believed that the success expectancies of the goals were opposite to the 
actual success expectancies.4 Incorrect probe responses occurred on 1.87% of the trials. The data 
from these trials were excluded from the analyses. 1.76% of all probe responses were discarded 
as outliers. Means and standard deviations of the dot probe task responses can be found in Table 
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2. Participants made errors on 1.60% of the goal task trials.5 
 
(Table 2 about here) 
 First, on trials comparing the high success expectancy goal word to control words, RTs 
were significantly faster when probes were preceded by a high success expectancy goal word 
than when probes were preceded by a control word, M = 456 ms, SD = 77 ms, and, M = 483 ms, 
SD = 83 ms, respectively, t(27) = -3.85, p < .002. Second, on trials comparing the low success 
expectancy goal word to control words, RTs were significantly faster to detect probes preceded 
by a low success expectancy goal word than to detect probes preceded by a control word, M = 
462 ms, SD = 80 ms, and, M = 479 ms, SD = 84 ms, respectively, t(27) = -3.52, p < .003. Of 
crucial importance were again the trials comparing the two goal-relevant words. As expected, 
RTs were significantly faster when the probe appeared on the former location of the high success 
expectancy goal word than when the probe appeared on the former location of the low success 
expectancy goal word, M = 468 ms, SD = 80 ms, and, M = 485 ms, SD = 88 ms, respectively, 
t(27) = -2.39, p < .03. Fourth, RTs did not differ on trials comparing control words, t(27) = -
.687, ns. 
Discussion 
The present study examined whether the prioritising of a goal affects the allocation of 
spatial attention to stimuli relevant to multiple goals. The results are in line with our hypotheses. 
Experiment 1 showed that attention was oriented to stimuli relevant to a goal with high value 
when presented simultaneously with stimuli relevant to a goal with low value. Demonstrating the 
stability of the effect, Experiment 2 replicated and extended this finding by showing that 
attention was allocated to stimuli relevant to a goal with high expectancy of success when 
presented simultaneously with stimuli relevant to a goal with low expectancy of success. 
Spatial attention and goal prioritising 
 
12
Moreover, as expected, we found that attention was allocated to both goal-relevant words when 
these words were presented simultaneously with control words. 
Our results corroborate the growing evidence demonstrating that spatial attention is 
biased towards goal-relevant events (e.g., Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 1992; Moskowitz, 2002; 
Rothermund, 2003). First, our results demonstrate that the influence of goals on the allocation of 
spatial attention is not limited to situations in which only one goal is activated. Second, our 
results reveal that the allocation of spatial attention also reflects differences in the relative 
relevance of these goals. Recent research showed that a goal representation conveys more 
information than only what kind of stimuli or stimulus dimensions are goal relevant. In 
particular, the activation level of a goal representation reflects the motivational strength of goal 
pursuit and thus how important a goal is (Förster et al., 2005). The present results reveal that the 
allocation of spatial attention is very quickly affected by even fine-grained relevance differences 
between multiple goals that are simultaneously present. By this, our findings provide the first 
evidence that the allocation of spatial attention supports the management of multiple goals and 
especially the prioritising of one goal.  
The Theory of Visual Attention (TVA) by Bundesen (1990) can account for these effects 
on a theoretical level. The influence of goals on attention is supposed to be mediated by the 
activation of goal representations in working and long-term memory that bias the attentional 
selection to prefer matching stimuli in the environment (Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Moskowitz, 
Li, & Kirk, 2004; Soto, Hodsoll, Rotshtein, & Humphreys, 2008). More importantly, TVA states 
that such representations have an attentional weight that reflects their relevance. A high weight 
raises the probability that matching stimuli get selected. Consequently, the representation of a 
high priority goal should have a higher attentional weight than the representation of a low 
priority goal. In a similar vein, Treisman (1960) proposed that the representation of an incoming 
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stimulus needs to reach a certain activation level (“threshold”) in order to be consciously 
recognized. Importantly, the current relevance of a stimulus can increase the resting level of its 
representation which makes it more likely to reach the threshold when the stimulus impinges the 
system.  
It needs to be mentioned that the value and the expectancy of success associated with a 
goal are only two examples of factors that determine the motivational strength of goal pursuit. 
There are other characteristics of goals as well as individual preferences or situational demands 
that determine the relevance of a goal (Austin & Vancouver, 1996). Furthermore, expectancy and 
value of a goal can interact, making a goal with both high value and high expectancy of success 
most relevant (Atkinson, 1964; Förster et al., 2005).  
 Another issue concerns the relation between multiple goals that are present in a situation. 
First, the two implemented goals in our study served the same superordinate goal (achieving the 
maximum score in the goal task) and can therefore be described as subgoals or means to this goal 
(Kruglanski et al., 2002). Multiple goals that an individual holds often represent subgoals to a 
superordinate goal, for instance, when a student has to pass different exams in order to get a 
degree. Our results are relevant only for these types of situations. One should, for instance, be 
careful in generalizing the present findings to situations in which multiple goals are independent 
of each other (e.g., a student having the goal of passing an exam and the goal of being able to run 
a marathon). Second, in our study, participants were still pursuing the low priority goal. 
Consequently we found a bias to words relevant to this goal when we compared them to control 
stimuli. This result might change when multiple goals are conflicting and cannot be pursued in 
parallel. In this case, it seems likely that low priority goals have to be inhibited (Shah et al., 
2002). Hence, when multiple goals are conflicting, attention might not at all be allocated to 
events relevant to low priority goals. 
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 What are the implications of the present findings for multiple goal pursuit situations in 
everyday life? In the present study, the implemented goals required participants to detect goal-
relevant words. In daily life, however, people do not always have such specific detection goals. 
One might thus wonder whether our findings extend to other goals that do not require being 
attentive to goal-relevant events in one’s environment (i.e., non-detection goals). Concerning the 
pursuit of a single goal, Moskowitz (2002) demonstrated that attending to goal-relevant events 
occurs also for non-detection goals. In his study, the goal of being egalitarian was activated by 
letting participants remember instances in which they failed to act egalitarian towards members 
of minority groups. Experiencing failure in goal pursuit has been shown to strengthen the 
activation of a goal (e.g., Rothermund, 2003; Förster et al., 2005). The results of his study 
showed that words relevant to this goal (e.g., tolerant) attracted attention. Given that attention is 
directed to both words relevant for a detection goal and words relevant for non-detection goals, 
we believe that the effects of goal prioritising on attention for goal-relevant words will also be 
similar for both types of goals. For instance, a student being more motivated to succeed in a 
psychology exam than to succeed in a statistics exams might be more attentive to words related 
to the psychology exam than to words related to the statistics exam. However, everyday-life 
goals might often be more complex than the goals implemented in the present study. Because of 
this, conflicts between different goals are more likely to arise, meaning that often only one goal 
(i.e., the prioritised goal) can be pursued in a given situation. As already pointed out above, 
attending of stimuli relevant to non-prioritized goals might depend on whether those goals are in 
conflict with more important goals that are active in the same situation. For instance, when 
conflicting goals are present, stimuli that are relevant to non-prioritised goals might not be 
attended at all or might even evoke attentional avoidance. 
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 An increasing number of studies demonstrated that attention is also automatically 
allocated to goal-relevant events (Folk et al., 1992; Ansorge & Neumann, 2005; Rothermund, 
2003). Although there are not absolute criteria for defining a process as automatic (Moors & De 
Houwer, 2006), two arguments support the conclusion that our effects were due to the automatic 
allocation of attention. First, we observed the effect at a cue-target interval of 350 ms and with 
RTs of less than 500 ms. Hence, the time window in which strategic processes could have 
influenced responses was very short. Prior studies using two words as cues typically 
implemented a cue-target interval of 500 ms (see Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-
Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007). Second, attending to goal-relevant words in the dot probe 
task was not instrumental for the goal task. Additionally, attending to the cues in the dot probe 
task was also not instrumental for the dot probe task because none of the cue categories predicted 
the probe location above chance level. Hence, attending to goal words in this task might have 
been unintentional.  
 Several limitations of the present research can be addressed in future studies. First, it 
would be worthwhile to investigate the effects of multiple goals that are more independent of 
each other (e.g., using two different goal-inducing tasks) or even conflicting (e.g., implementing 
goal-inducing tasks that cannot be performed in parallel). As we argued above, the relation 
between the multiple goals that are present in a situation could have an important impact on the 
allocation of attention. Furthermore, it might be interesting to use goal tasks that provide more 
clear indices of participant’s motivation to reach the goals. In the present study, the fact that 
responses after high priority goals in the goal task were faster than responses after low priority 
goals (see Footnotes 3 and 5) suggests that participants indeed strove more for the high than for 
the low priority goal.  However, the speed of the responses during the goal task was not relevant 
for the task itself. It is therefore not clear whether the speed of responding during the goal task 
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does provide an index of the strength of goal pursuit. There are different ways in which the 
motivational strength of goal pursuit might have influenced the speed of these responses. For 
instance, due to selective attention, words relevant to the high priority goal might have been 
detected more rapidly in the goal task which resulted in faster responses to these words. 
Nevertheless, future studies should for instance make response speed relevant in the goal task. 
 Future studies might not only use different goal tasks but could also optimize the dot 
probe task that is used to register attention. In our studies, participants could in principle fulfil 
the dot probe task by monitoring one of the two probe locations. For instance, if the probe is 
presented in the location that is monitored, the corresponding key can be pressed and in case that 
the probe does not appear in this location, the other key can be pressed. Nevertheless, the fact 
that we did observe the expected effects in the dot probe task shows that our task was sensitive 
enough. Also note that the procedure of the experiments discouraged a strategy of monitoring 
either the upper or lower location of the screen. In our experiments, dot probe trials alternated 
with goal trials which required participants to attend to the middle of the screen because in the 
goal task stimuli were presented at that location. This should have encouraged participants to 
follow the instructions of the dot probe task, namely to maintain attention at the fixation cross 
presented in middle of the screen during the dot probe trials. However, future research can solve 
this issue in a more definite manner by using probes that need to be categorized (e.g., two dots in 
horizontal vs. vertical arrangement). 
 In conclusion, the present study is the first one to show that the (automatic) allocation of 
spatial attention reflects the prioritising of a goal and thus the motivational strength of goal 
pursuit in multiple goal pursuit situations. Our study opens the way for future research in which 
the influence of goals on spatial attention can be examined in the context of multiple goal 
pursuit.  
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Footnotes 
1Trials comparing the two control words were implemented to present all four words 
equally often over the whole experiment.  
2
The data of these four participants showed a significant attentional bias for the low value 
goal word in the trials comparing the two goal-relevant words, t(3) = 3.26, p < .05. Concerning 
the other effects, they showed the same pattern as the other participants.  
3
We analysed the RTs from goal trials with goal-relevant words in order to see whether 
participants were faster to react after a high value goal word had been presented than after a low 
value goal word had been presented. The RT was defined as the time between the onset of the 
question mark and the registration of the spacebar response. The analyses indicated that RTs 
after high value goal words (M = 430 ms; SD = 95 ms) were faster than RTs after low value goal 
words (M = 462 ms; SD = 108 ms), t(40) = -3.00, p < .01. This suggests that participants 
prioritised the high value goal in the goal task. 
4
The same conclusions were reached when her data were included. 
5
As in Experiment 1, we analysed the RTs from goal trials presenting goal-relevant 
words. The analyses revealed that RTs after high success expectancy goal words (M = 404 ms; 
SD = 99 ms) were faster than RTs after low success expectancy goal words (M = 441 ms; SD = 
88 ms), t(27) = -4.29, p < .001. This suggests that participants prioritised the high success 
expectancy goal.
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Table 1 
 Mean Latencies and Standard Deviations (in ms) as a Function of Trial Type and Probe Location in Experiment 1  
 
 
                                          Latency 
Trial Type  Probe Locationa M SD
 
High value vs. control 
 
High value goal word 449 67
 Control word 465 74
Low value vs. control Low value goal word 447 68
 Control word 464 75
High value vs. low value High value goal word 453 68
 Low value goal word 463 68
Control vs. control  Control word 1 457 73
 Control word 2 450 68
 Note. aProbe location implies that the probe replaced the cue word category mentioned in a line of                                                       
 this column.   
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Table 2 
 Mean Latencies and Standard Deviations (in ms) as a Function of Trial Type and Probe Location in Experiment 2  
 
 
                                          Latency 
Trial Type  Probe Locationa M SD
 
High expectancy vs. control 
 
High expectancy goal word 456 77
 Control word 483 83
Low expectancy vs. control Low expectancy goal word 462 80
 Control word 479 84
High expectancy vs. low expectancy High expectancy goal word 468 80
 Low expectancy goal word 485 88
Control vs. control  Control word 1 468 84
 Control word 2 473 85
 Note. aProbe location implies that the probe replaced the cue word category mentioned in a line of                                                       
 this column.     
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Figure captions 
Figure 1. Schematic overview of an example trial of the combined dot probe and goal task in the 
experiments. The first three boxes depict the dot probe task in which the presentation of two cue 
words was followed by a target which had to be localized. The last two boxes display the goal 
task in which the presentation of a single word was followed by the appearance of a question 
mark. Participants had to react to the question mark by pressing the spacebar when the single 
word presented before had been one of the two goal-relevant words.
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Figure 1. 
 
 
